Multinational corporations have long been recognized as both major creators of technology and as conduits of technology transfer. Technology transfer can happen directly, when the a¢ liate licenses the technology from the parent, or indirectly, when the a¢ liate imports intermediate goods with embodied technology. This paper estimates the e¤ect of the a¢ liates' productivity relative to the frontier -the technology gap -on the choice of licensing the technology or importing it through intermediate goods. A novel measure of multinational technology transfer is employed using data on technology licensing payments versus imports from U.S. multinationals across many countries and industries. The main …nding of this paper is that a large technology gap of an a¢ liate favors indirect knowledge transfer through imports. On average, a 10% increase in the technology gap decreases the share of licensing versus importing inputs embodying the technology by 5%. Considering that access to ideas and generation of new ones are crucial for long-run economic growth and convergence of a country, this study highlights the policy implications for countries to raise their productivity levels.
Introduction
There has been a signi…cant increase in the levels of global trade in goods and services. Two components of this increase are noteworthy: currently, global trade in ideas is reaching annual levels of $200 billion (World Development Indicators), 1 and trade in intermediate inputs comprises 57% of total trade in goods in OECD countries (Miroudot, Lanz and Ragoussis 2009) .
The United States is a major seller of technology, accounting for around 50% of world royalties and license fee receipts (World Development Indicators), and trade in intermediate inputs in the U.S. accounts for half of total trade in goods (Miroudot et al. 2009 A MNC can transfer its technology to foreign a¢ liates in disembodied form (know-how, industrial processes, computer software) or in embodied form (intermediate inputs). Flows of royalty and license receipts from a¢ liates to parents for the use of intangible technology is evidence of disembodied technology transfer, while exports of goods for further processing from parents to a¢ liates can indicate embodied technology transfer. It is well known that technology transfer is an important determinant of long-term cross-country income, economic growth and convergence of countries. However, the mode of technology transfer in embodied versus disembodied form has a di¤erential impact not only on access to current knowledge and economic growth, but also on innovation, economic welfare, and convergence. The history of the 1 Trade in disembodied ideas is measured by world receipts (or payments) of royalties and license fees.
soft drink "Fanta", which was invented by the German a¢ liate of the Coca-Cola Company, o¤ers one example. Possessing the recipe for Coca-Cola but lacking all the required ingredients due to a shortage in World War II-era Germany, Coca-Cola Deutschland invented this new soft drink by using the only available ingredients instead. In addition, the mode of technology transfer might also a¤ect the degree of knowledge spillovers from multinational a¢ liates to domestic …rms, which improves the productivity of the latter. But in October 2010, the company announced the opening of a new wafer fabrication facility (fab) in China capable of using the blueprint to make the actual chips. At the same time, Intel announced the opening of a chip assembly factory in Vietnam (Takahashi 2010a; 2010b) . One of the reasons why Chinese a¢ liates of Intel Corporation currently receive technology in the form of blueprints while Vietnamese a¢ liates receive technology in the for of intermediate goods is that the former are currently closer to the productivity frontier, while the latter are farther from the frontier.
A panel data on the activities of U.S. multinationals in 47 host countries and across 7 manufacturing industries is employed to analyze the relationship between the a¢ liate's technology gap and the share of importing technology versus inputs. Focusing on the activities of U.S. MNCs is attractive as there is information on both the technology and input ‡ows within …rms. These data come from legally mandated benchmark surveys, conducted every …ve years by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), which enable the identi…cation of U.S. parent-a¢ liate tangible and intangible technology transfers across FDI host countries and industries. The technology gap is measured as the deviation of the a¢ liate's labor productivity from the parent productivity in the same industry and year. The main …nding of this paper is that the technology gap is negatively related to the share of disembodied versus embodied technology transfer, with a 10 percent increase in the technology gap on average decreasing the share of licensing versus importing inputs by 5 percent.
The signi…cance of this paper stems from the realization that, based on industry patterns, MNCs tend to share know-how with country a¢ liates that are more productive, but export intermediate goods to the less productive ones. The fact that a¢ liates which are far from the frontier receive technology in the form of goods and not disembodied ideas, leads to policy implications that for developing less-productive countries the reduction in the technology gap would involve direct access to knowledge and ideas. This not only gives such countries access to current information, but also stimulates the creation of new knowledge which in itself is important for long-run economic growth and convergence.
The theory on multinational enterprises identi…es horizontal and vertical directions for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Horizontal FDI arises when multinationals replicate their production in host countries to gain market access (Markusen 1984) , whereas vertical FDI arises when di¤erent stages of production are fragmented to take advantage of di¤erences in factor prices (Helpman 1984) , intra-industry considerations (Alfaro and Charlton 2009) , or international transaction costs (Keller and Yeaple 2012) . 3 Country empirical studies have found that market sizes, country similarity, factor endowments, and barriers to trade are among the most important determinants of FDI, while country-industry studies …nd that these factors have a di¤erential impact on FDI in various industries. 4 This paper contributes to the growing body of literature on vertical production sharing within multinationals, where part of production takes place locally in a¢ liates while the other is imported from parents (Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter 2005; Fouquin, Nayman and Wagner 2007; Keller and Yeaple 2012) . Hanson and coauthors …nd that MNC foreign a¢ liate's demand for imported inputs is higher in a¢ liate countries with lower trade costs, lower wages for lessskilled labor, and lower corporate income tax rates (Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter 2005 A second body of literature has documented the importance of productivity di¤erences in subsidiaries of foreign companies for knowledge ‡ows within MNCs. 6 Bjorn and coauthors …nd 3 Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen (2007) formalize "export-platform" FDI with both horizontal and vertical motivations.
4 See Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001) , Bergstrand and Egger (2007), Brainard (1997) for country studies, and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and Awokuse, Maskus and An (2012) for country-industry studies.
5 Keller and Yeaple (2008) Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) . Using country-level analysis, they …nd that knowledge ‡ows within multinationals from home to host country are higher the lower the relative level of economic development of the host country (measured by GDP per capita). 8 The survey used in Dri¢ eld et al. (2010) is based on a binary response to whether there was transfer of scienti…c and technological knowledge from parent to a¢ liate, which does not distinguish between tangible (intermediate goods) and intangible (patents, licenses, software) forms. the impact, but also parameter estimates. A limitation of this paper is the usage of aggregated country-industry level data due to inaccessibility of con…dential …rm-level data from the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section highlights the theoretical foundation. Section 3 presents the empirical estimation strategy and discusses estimation issues.
Section 4 details data sources, variable construction, and descriptive statistics. The results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Theoretical Foundation
The objective of this paper is to estimate whether there is a connection between the technological gap of MNC a¢ liates and the mode of international knowledge transfer from the multinational parents to a¢ liates across countries and industries. This paper focuses on one parent country's (the United States) a¢ liates abroad as it imposes certain homogeneity in terms of a¢ liate activities. Assume that U.S. multinationals decided where to locate their foreign a¢ liates. 9 The remaining decision involves the type of knowledge transfer, which is measured by the transfer of technology (know-how, industrial processes) versus intermediate goods from the U.S. parents to host country a¢ liates. 10 Direct measures of technology licensing payments and imports of goods for further processing are used to speci…cally pin down the share of disembodied versus embodied technology transfer from the U.S. parents to a¢ liates. The technology gap of an a¢ liate is 9 Since the analysis in this paper is based on industry data, it prevents the study of questions related to the …rm-level location decisions of the U.S. MNC a¢ liates abroad.
1 0 This paper does not include arm's length technology transfer of U.S. multinational corporations to other una¢ liated domestic or foreign entities. Within-…rm technology transfer in the form of intermediate inputs and ideas from U.S. parents to a¢ liates is the main focus of this paper. Other types of embodied technology might include capital goods and people, which are beyond the scope of this paper. measured by the deviation of its labor productivity from the parent's labor productivity in the same industry and year.
The approach for estimating the relationship between the technology gap and international knowledge transfer is as follows. I specify that the share of technology transfer (in intangible and tangible forms) to an a¢ liate country c in industry i, T T ci is a function of the technology gap of an a¢ liate country c in industry i; T G ci and of other observed and unobserved determinants,
( 1) where is a vector of unknown parameters. The equation (1) According to this theory, it is harder to transfer technology in more knowledge-intensive industries because technology is tacit and hard to codify, which means it is best conveyed faceto-face. 11 In the absence of in-person communication, the technology transfer may be more 1 1 For a discussion of the importance of face-to-face communication for transfering technology, see for example Koskinen and Vanharanta (2002) and Hovhannisyan and Keller (2011). imperfect the more knowledge-intensive the industry is. Multinational …rms face a tradeo¤ between trade costs and technology transfer costs, which explains why there is a gravity of multinational sales, where a¢ liate sales fall with distance from the home country.
Since a¢ liate sales are positively related to productivity, this theory serves as a conceptual framework to explain what drives productivity di¤erences across a¢ liate countries and industries. Trade costs and technology transfer costs increase with distance to the U.S., which is re ‡ected in the lower productivity of a¢ liates. Furthermore, for a given distance from the U.S., a more knowledge-intensive industry, on average, receives lower a¢ liate sales (lower productivity).
The theoretical framework suggests taking into account trade costs and technology transfer costs in driving productivity di¤erences across host countries and industries. The following section discusses the empirical methodology.
Empirical Methodology
Based on the theoretical framework described above, the following estimation equation is employed:
where c indexes a¢ liate countries, i indexes industries, t indexes time. Licensing-import share is de…ned as
where royalties and license receipts of the U.S. parents from the a¢ liates is a measure of payments for the usage of disembodied technology, and U.S. exports of goods for further manufacture from U.S. parents to a¢ liates is a measure of embodied technology in the form of intermediate goods.
Technology gap is de…ned as
where P arentLabprod it is parent labor productivity in an industry and year, and Labprod cit is a¢ liate labor productivity in a country, industry and year.
Based on theory described above (Keller and Yeaple 2012) , the productivity of a¢ liates falls with distance from the United States due to increasing trade costs and technology transfer costs.
Furthermore, technology transfer in more knowledge-intensive industries is more costly than in less knowledge-intensive industries. Thus, the labor productivity of a¢ liates is weighted by the relative distance of the a¢ liate country from the U.S., as well as the relative knowledge-intensity of the industry. The weighted labor productivity Labprod cit is constructed as
where Dist c is geographical distance between the U.S. and the a¢ liate country, KI it is knowledge-intensity of an industry measured by parent R&D expenditures over sales (following Keller and Yeaple 2012) , and g Labprod cit is unweighted labor productivity of a¢ liates.
Turning to remaining variables of equation (2), X1 is a vector of control variables at the country-industry-year level such as trade costs, X2 is a vector of control variables at the countryyear level such as population, GDP per capita, and human and physical capital per worker, c are country …xed e¤ects, and t are time …xed e¤ects. It is expected that the coe¢ cient on will be negative, implying that the smaller the technology gap of an a¢ liates is (closer to frontier productivity), the more the a¢ liate will import technology directly (paying royalties and license fees) relative to importing goods for further processing. 12
It is important to mention that licensing-import share is bounded between 0 and 1 with
clusters of values at extreme points. We can employ a two-part Tobit model which is a widely used estimation method for censored data. Greene (2004) shows that maximum likelihood estimates of Tobit with …xed e¤ects exhibit almost no bias, and incidental parameter problems do not need special adjustment. An alternative to Tobit is fractional logit model, suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (1996; , where conditional mean is modeled as a logistic function.
Before turning to the empirical analysis and results, the next section gives an overview of the data and descriptive statistics of the main variables.
1 2 In the robustness analysis, other measures of frontier will be employed as well.
Data 4.1 Main Variables
The primary data used in this paper are based on operations of U.S. MNCs abroad and come from the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The data cover 47 countries where U.S. multinationals have a¢ liates, span 7 NAICS manufacturing industries, and include 2 benchmark survey years (1999 and 2004) . The manufacturing industries used in the analysis are food, chemicals, primary and fabricated metals, machinery, computers and electronic products, electrical equipment, appliances and components, and transportation equipment. The list of a¢ liate countries used in the analysis is given in Appendix 1. The analysis is restricted to the benchmark survey years because part of the data is available only in these surveys. 13 Additionally, industry classi…cation has changed from SIC to NAICS, which prevents using earlier benchmark years. 14 Licensing-Import Share is constructed using data on royalties and license fees received by U.S. parents and on U.S. exports of goods shipped to majority-owned a¢ liates for further processing. Royalties and license receipts, net of withholding taxes, received by U.S. parents from its a¢ liates comes from the balance of payments and direct investment position data Technology gap is constructed using data on the gross product and number of employees of U.S. MNC parents and majority-owned foreign a¢ liates from the BEA. First, labor productivity of MNC parents is calculated as gross product (value added) divided by the number of employees for a given industry and year. It is taken as the frontier for a given industry and year. Then, labor productivity of majority-owned foreign a¢ liates is calculated as gross product (value added) divided by the number of employees for a given country, industry and year. 22 Finally, labor productivity of a¢ liates is weighted according to equation (5), where distance data is obtained from CEPII and R&D data from the BEA. The technology gap of a given a¢ liate is constructed as a relative di¤erence from the frontier labor productivity (see equation 4). In this form, di¤erences in productivity across industries are controlled for, and the identi…cation of technology gap comes from variation across a¢ liate countries and years in a given manufacturing industry.
2 0 Although the U.S. exports of goods for further manufacture includes goods shipped from the U.S. parents or other U.S. entities, overall around 85% of imports by a¢ liates from the United States is from the U.S. parents.
2 1 Because of non-disclosure and con…dentiality, the BEA does not provide small portion of data for royalties and license fees and for U.S. exports of goods for further manufacture broken down by country and industry. Data given in a range [-$500,000; $500,000] is coded as $500,000; data is …lled in with the same number for observations where country-industry data is available for one year and missing for another (11% for exports, and 3% for royalties).
2 2 Due to con…dentiality, a small portion of employment …gures is given in ranges; in those cases, the midpoint of the range is taken. parents in that industry, the larger will be the share of imported technology versus goods, as in these industries a¢ liates' ability to use know-how directly will be increased. One possible reason is that if an a¢ liate performs R&D itself, it can understand the technology better as technology tends to be tacit.
Controls
Although the empirical analysis controls for country and year …xed e¤ects, there may still be di¤erences across host country a¢ liates over time, and across industries. One of the most important factors that will impact licensing-import share is trade costs, as it is costly to transfer goods across borders. Following Hanson and colleagues (2005) and Keller and Yeaple (2012) , ad-valorem trade costs at country-industry-year level are constructed as a sum of freight costs and tari¤s: 
Descriptive Statistics
The …nal sample is an unbalanced panel of 47 countries, 7 manufacturing industries, and 2 years (1999 and 2004) . Summary statistics of the main variables are presented in Table 1 . 28 On average, exports of goods for further manufacture is around 8 times larger than royalties and license receipts. 29 Table 2 presents industry averages of licensing-import share and technology gap variables.
On average, the highest licensing-import share is observed in the food industry (0.431), and the lowest in computers (0.102). The technology gap varies on average from 0.516 in food to 0.937 in computers. Country averages of licensing-import share and technology gap are presented in Table 3 . On average, the lowest licensing-import share is in Brazil (0.043) and the highest licensing-import share across countries is in Saudi Arabia (0.914). The variation in technology gap ranges from 0.5 in Switzerland to 1.050 in Ecuador on average. 31 2 8 In this analysis, I focus on positive numbers of technology gap, as my analysis does not apply to the case when weighted labor productivity of a¢ liates is larger than parent labor productivity. Since weighted labor productivity is based on distance, Canada is a large outlier which is dropped from the analysis. 3 0 Around 34% of royalties and license fees are zero, and around 24% of U.S. exports of goods for manufacture are zero, which by construction results in 15% of zero values in licensing-import share variable.
3 1 There were industries where Ecuador had negative gross product which resulted in a technology gap higher
The empirical strategy controls for country and year …xed e¤ects, so general di¤erences across a¢ liate countries and across years are controlled. Additionally, since labor productivities di¤er across industries, technology gap compares labor productivities within the same industry-year.
The next section presents the empirical results.
Results
The goal of the empirical analysis is to estimate a relationship between the technology gap of U.S. multinationals foreign a¢ liates and licensing-import share: import of technology versus import of goods. Table 4 presents initial estimation results of the equation (2) What is the magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cient? The mean of licensing-import share is 0:25, while the mean of technology gap is 0:78 (see Table 1 ). Based on the estimated coe¢ cient, this means that at the mean a 10% increase in the technology gap of a U.S. MNC a¢ liate, compared to the parent in the same industry, decreases the share of licensing versus importing inputs embodying the technology by 5%: 32 The magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cient is economically sizeable.
To gauge general across-country di¤erences in technology gap and licensing-import share, country …xed e¤ects are dropped in column 6. The technology gap is still negative and signi…cant, although the magnitude of the coe¢ cient decreases from around 0:15 to around 0:118. It is surprising that GDP per capita becomes negative and signi…cant, while IPR protection becomes insigni…cant. Overall, the results from table 4 indicate that there is a signi…cant e¤ect of technology gap on licensing-import share.
Although the OLS results reported in Table 4 provide important benchmark estimates, additional econometric models are estimated in Table 5 . For convenience, column 1 repeats the OLS regression presented in Table 4 Licensing-import share is constructed by combining data on embodied and disembodied technological transfer. To understand the di¤erences between these two types of technology transfer, decomposition of the dependent variable is performed in Table 6 . For convenience, column 1 of Table 6 repeats the benchmark estimates of Table 4 (column 5) with licensing-import share as the dependent variable. In column 2, the dependent variable is intermediate goods import intensity, constructed as U.S. exports of goods for further manufacture divided by a¢ liate sales. As expected, the coe¢ cient on technology gap is estimated to be positive and signi…cant, implying that a¢ liates with a large technology gap on average import more intermediate goods.
Additionally, the coe¢ cient on trade costs is negative and signi…cant, meaning that trade costs decrease intermediate goods import intensity. Turning to column 3, where the dependent variable is disembodied technology transfer intensity (royalty and license fees divided by a¢ liate sales), as expected the coe¢ cient is negative although not signi…cant. The sign of the coe¢ cient implies that a¢ liates with large technology gap receive relatively less technology in disembodied form.
The fact that technology gap in this case is not signi…cantly estimated probably has to do with small values of royalty and license fees. Overall, the decomposition analysis of licensing-import share conforms to our expectations.
The technology gap of a¢ liates is constructed using parent productivity as the frontier and is based on weighted labor productivity of a¢ liates (see equations 4 and 5). Table 7 presents results using alternative measures of technology gap. Column 1 repeats the benchmark estimates of Table 4 (column 5) for convenience. Recall that labor productivity is weighted by the relative distance of a¢ liate country and relative knowledge intensity of an industry (see equation 5). In column 2, technology gap is constructed based on unweighted labor productivity. The coe¢ cient on technology gap is still negative and signi…cant, however the magnitude of the coe¢ cient decreases from 0:150 to 0:117. The weighted coe¢ cient is larger, which shows that it is important to account for di¤erences in proximity of a¢ liates of U.S. parents to home, as well as the knowledge-intensity of an industry.
Another feasible option for de…ning technology gap involves using a di¤erent frontier measure.
To test the robustness of using parent productivity as a frontier, we can de…ne the frontier as the most productive a¢ liate in the same industry and year, as it is possible that parents and a¢ liates perform di¤erent tasks. Then, the technology gap of a given a¢ liate is de…ned as a relative di¤erence from the most productive a¢ liate in the same industry and year. It is important to note that in all cases, the frontier a¢ liate comes from a high-income country a¢ liate. The results of this exercise are reported in column 3 of Table 7 . Using a¢ liate frontier, the coe¢ cient on technology gap is estimated to be negative and signi…cant and close to the benchmark ( 0:147 compared to benchmark 0:150). Additionally, the signs and estimates of the controls are very similar to the benchmark estimates. This shows that the results are not sensitive to the de…nition of the frontier.
As an additional robustness check, technology gap based on productivity per a¢ liate versus productivity per worker is constructed. Using data on the number of a¢ liates separately by country and by industry, the number of a¢ liates by country-industry is calculated. Productivity per a¢ liate is constructed as gross product divided by the number of a¢ liates. In a similar fashion, productivity per parent is constructed. Then, the technology gap is calculated as a relative deviation of productivity per a¢ liate from productivity per parent. The results using productivity per a¢ liate are presented in column 4 of Table 7 . The estimated coe¢ cient on technology gap using productivity per a¢ liate is not signi…cantly estimated. However, the sign of the coe¢ cient is still negative. Overall, this table shows that the main results of this paper are not sensitive to the de…nition of frontier used in the construction of technology gap. In all four cases, technology gap is negatively associated with licensing-import share.
Conclusions
Multinational corporations are the main mediators of the worldwide increase in technology trade.
Intermediate inputs and know-how are the two forms of technology (tangible and intangible) transferred within multinational corporations that this paper has examined. This paper analyzed what determines the decision of multinationals on the form of technology transfer to its a¢ liates, using data on U.S. multinational activity in 47 countries, 7 manufacturing industries and 2 years.
Detailed data on exports of goods for further processing, as well as royalties and license payments observed between U.S. MNC parents and their a¢ liates, enables us to speci…cally identify two types of knowledge transfer from parents to a¢ liates.
The main …nding of this paper is that the technology gap, measured as the relative labor productivity di¤erence from the frontier, is negatively related to the share of direct versus indirect Licensing-Import Share Notes: All specifications include year fixed effects. Robust standard errors which allow for clustering by country-year are reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
